

2008-2009 Tuition and Fees in Higher Education *

Brian T. Kench

Department of Economics
University of Tampa
401 W. Kennedy Blvd
Tampa, FL 33606
(813) 257-3867

H. Scott Wallace

Division of Business and Economics
University of Wisconsin-Stevens Point
416 College of Professional Studies
Stevens Point, WI 54481-3897
(715) 346-4358

Kevin Neuman

Division of Business and Economics
University of Wisconsin – Stevens Point
418 College of Professional Studies
Stevens Point, WI 54481-3897
(715) 346-3875

ABSTRACT:

Using data sets from U.S. News & World Report, the Princeton Review, and the Association to Advance Collegiate Schools of Business, this paper isolates 3 control variables, 7 choice variables, 18 rankings variables that account for between 79 and 90% of the variation in tuition and fees across 518 institutions of higher learning in the United States. It is hoped that the results will give guidance to schools by quantifying the costs and benefits of making a given change to their tuition and fee structure.

Key Words: U.S. Higher Education, Mapping, Tuition & Fees

JEL Classifications: L11, I22

2008-2009 Tuition and Fees in Higher Education

* Radmila Marinkovic provided able research assistance.

Introduction

The degree of heterogeneity among institutions of higher learning in the U.S. is considerable. Universities and colleges are differentiated across a wide variety of attributes: public versus private, graduate programs versus no graduate programs and religious versus secular to name a few. In addition, many colleges and universities focus their resources in excelling in specialized fields. This diversity is a great strength and is one of the reasons why the United States remains the world leader in education at the university level.

The attributes colleges and universities possess obviously are critical in determining the choices of attendees. Yet, administrative decisions regarding the level of tuition and fees often are haphazard and unrelated to the strengths of the university. In an era of declining taxpayer support and unfavorable demographic trends, public institutions, in particular, need to set tuition to the specific benefits that they offer students. To do this wisely, schools must assess their competitive positions vis-à-vis other institutions. Using data sets from U.S. News & World Report (USNWR), the Princeton Review (PR), and the Association to Advance Collegiate Schools of Business (AACSB), we isolate 3 control variables, 7 choice variables, 18 rankings variables that account for 79 to 90 percent of the variation in tuition and fees across 518 institutions of higher learning. An objective of this analysis is to analyze market outcomes econometrically in an effort to assist administrators in their task of setting tuition and fees given their school's market attributes.

Mapping Competitive Markets

The theoretical foundation that underpins the analysis used in this paper dates back to the 1960s with the work of economist Lancaster (1966, 1971). Lancaster introduced a new approach to consumer theory that emphasized the importance of product characteristics in the utility maximizing choices of consumers. This *characteristics* approach “assumes that consumer demand is directed not towards products per se but rather towards product characteristics. For example, when searching for a computer, consumers look for microprocessor speed, RAM

capacity, hard disk capacity, screen size, and so forth. A consumer's valuation for a particular computer is the sum of the valuations for each particular characteristic" (Cabral, 2000, 207). The *characteristics* approach has led to efforts in developing empirical methods for hedonic models, which are used to estimate the demand for consumer products. Drawing upon data on car models sold in the U.S. from 1971 to 1990, economists, for example, have estimated "own- and cross-price elasticities as well as elasticities of demand with respect to vehicle attributes (such as weight or fuel efficiency)" (Berry, et. al., 1995, 841). The value of this analysis is not limited to the economics discipline. For example, Gorman (1980) analyzed the egg market. Petrin (2002) studied the minivan market. And Benkard and Bajari (2004) estimated personal computer demand.

D' Aveni (2007) adapted the characteristics approach to create what he calls a "price-benefit positioning map." A price-benefit positioning map is similar to Lancaster's approach because it shows the relationship between the primary benefit that a product provides to customers and the prices of all the products in a given market (D' Aveni 2007, p. 112). The author outlines a number of steps that need to be completed in creating a price-benefit positioning map. First, the firm must define the relevant market for its product. This requires that it identify other products that are similar to the firm's own product in the sense that they satisfy the same consumer needs. In addition, firms must define the geographic region within which competition occurs. Second, firms need to collect data on prices of these products and on the benefits that these products provide to consumers. Drawing on this data, firms then perform regression analysis to find the relationship between product price (the dependent variable) and product benefits (the independent variables). Third, try to isolate the primary benefit (or group of correlated benefits) that accounts for the greatest variation in prices among competing products (D' Aveni, 2007).

Building on the above analysis, this paper seeks to isolate the variables that explain the variation in tuition and fees across institutions of higher education in the U.S. The results, we hope, will give guidance to enrolment management personal at colleges and universities by quantifying the costs and benefits of making a given change to their tuition and fee structure.

Data, Model and Results

The data sources are USNWR 2009, the AACSB, and PR.¹ Prospective students have the opportunity to consider a variety of colleges and universities across the U.S. Thus, we have used the U.S. the relevant geographic market for higher education. Within this geographic market we have included, from the 2009 USNWP, the top 84 northern master's level universities, the top 58 southern master's level universities, the top 56 western master's level universities, the top 69 mid-western master's level universities the top 133 national universities, and the top 118 top liberal arts colleges. Fourteen additional institutions had incomplete USNWR data and have been dropped from the study. Thus, the dataset used here contains 518 observations, which represents 23 percent of all colleges and universities in the U.S.²

We have collected data from 12 of the most common PR ranking categories for 2009. In each category, the top ten institutions are listed.

The AACSB data set details those colleges or universities that are accredited by AACSB in the fall of 2008. The mission of AACSB is to advance quality management education worldwide through accreditation and through leadership. Having the AACSB accreditation is thought to be a signal of educational excellence.

The dependent variable is the tuition and fees for the 2008-2009 academic year. We report the results of two OLS regressions below. The first uses in-state tuition and fees for public institutions and the second uses out-of-state tuition and fees for public institutions. The tuition and fees amount for private institutions is the same in both table 1 and table 2.

The model has three control variables. The first of these variables controls for religious affiliation: *secular* institutions, with no religious affiliation, are coded 0, while institutions that have a *religious* affiliation are coded 1. The second variable controls for private institutions: *public* institutions are coded 0, while *private* institutions are coded 1. The last control is for region of the country in which the institution is located. USNWR divides the United States into four regions: north, south, west, and mid-west. Here we have coded three dummy variables using

¹ See data are found at www.usnews.com, www.princetonreview.com, and www.aacsb.edu.

² Although we prefer an analysis of the total population, limited data have constrained our analysis to the available the sub-group.

regional boundaries defined by USNWR. Institutions located in the south (west, mid-west) are coded 1, while institutions outside of the south (west, mid-west) are coded 0. The three regional dummy variables are measured relative to institutions located in the north.

The model: $Tuition \& \text{fees} = a + b_i * \text{control variables} + b_j * \text{choice variables} + b_y * \text{rankings} + e.$

The model has seven choice variables, which are defined as variables that an institution has the freedom to change at their discretion. The first is the highest degree awarded. USNWR categorizes institutions as national, masters, or liberal arts, which turn out to be proxies for the highest degree awarded. At all national universities, the highest degree awarded is a PhD; at all masters universities, the highest degree awarded is a masters; and at all liberal arts colleges, the highest degree awarded is a bachelors. The *masters* variable has institutions that award masters level degrees coded 1, while all others are coded 0. The *PhD* variable has institutions that award PhD level degrees coded 1, while all others are coded 0. The differences in this category are measured relative to institutions where a *bachelors* degree is the highest degree awarded. The second choice variable measures *the percent of classes with less than 20 students*. The third choice variable measure *the percent of classes with greater than 50 students*. The fourth choice variable measures the *students-to-faculty ratio*. The fifth choice variable measures the *average graduation rate*.³ The sixth choice variable captures the size of the student population. Two dummy variables have been created for this purpose. Institutions that have a student population between 6,000 and 8,999 are coded 1, while all others are coded 0. Institutions that have a student population of 9,000 and higher are coded 1, while all others are coded 0. The differences in this category are measured relative to institutions that have a student population between 1 and 5,999. The final choice variable captures whether or not an institution has the AACSB business school accreditation. Institutions that are *AACSB* accredited are coded 1, while those that are not are coded 0.

³ USNWR defines the average graduation rate as the percentage of entering freshmen who graduated within a six-year period or less, averaged over the classes entering from 1999 through 2002. This calculation excludes students who transferred into the school. If a school submits fewer than four years of graduation rate data, then the average is based on the number of years that are submitted.

Lastly, the model has two sources of ranking variables: six variables from USNWR and 12 variables from the PR. The six USNWR ranking dummy variables are *top 10 masters-north*, *top 10 masters-south*, *top 10 masters-west*, *top 10 masters-mid-west*, *top 10 national*, and *top 10 liberal arts*. Institutions that are ranked in the top 10 in each USNWR ranking category are coded 1, while all other institutions are coded 0.

The 12 Princeton Review ranking dummy variables are *top 10 institutions with the best classroom experience*, *top 10 institutions with the best Greek life*, *top 10 institutions with the least happy students*, *top 10 institutions with the happiest students*, *top 10 institutions where students are happiest with financial aid*, *top 10 institutions that are socially liberal*, *top 10 socially conservative institutions*, *top 10 institutions with the most diverse student population*, *top 10 institutions with the most homogeneous student population*, *top 10 biggest party schools*, *top 10 institutions where students rarely study*, and *top 10 institutions where students always study*. Institutions that are ranked in the top 10 in each PR ranking category are coded 1, while all other institutions are coded 0.

Table 1: Full Regression Estimates: Ordinary Least Squares of a Tuition & Fees (In-State).

Parameter	Estimate	<i>p-value</i>
(Constant)	4285.52	.11
Secular	0	
Religious	-2577.78	<.00
Public	0	
Private	19727.95	<.00
North	0	
South	-3227.98	<.00
West	-1142.01	.03
Mid-west	-2013.51	<.00
Bachelors	0	
Masters	-3920.69	<.00
PhD	-3050.14	<.00
Percent of classes with less than 20 students	10.97	.54
Percent of classes with more than 50 students	-113.26	.05
Students to faculty ratio	-287.97	.00
Mean graduation rate	177.87	<.00
Student population between 1 and 5,999	0	
Student population between 6000 and 8999	1960.87	.00
Student population over 9000	2119.55	.00
No AACSB	0	
AACSB	1036.66	.04
USNWR top 10 masters north	260.04	.85
USNWR top 10 masters south	1817.75	.16
USNWR top 10 masters west	2548.01	.05

USNWR top 10 masters mid-west	-1233.82	.34
USNWR top 10 national universities	-95.20	.95
USNWR top 10 liberal arts	248.66	.86
PR top 10 institutions with the best classroom experience	1059.67	.48
PR top 10 institutions with the best Greek life	-81.45	.95
PR top 10 institutions with the least happy students	-758.55	.70
PR top 10 institutions with the happiest students	1094.74	.43
PR top 10 institutions where students are happiest with financial aid	-4292.81	.01
PR top 10 institutions that are socially liberal	2501.84	.10
PR top 10 socially conservative institutions	-4334.84	.01
PR top 10 institutions with the most diverse student population	-1137.95	.40
PR top 10 institutions with the most homogeneous student population	2529.97	.08
PR top 10 biggest party schools	-783.48	.61
PR top 10 institutions where students rarely study	-635.56	.71
PR top 10 institutions where students always study	-13.31	.99
Adjusted R-square .901; F-statistic = 147.91, p-value = <.00; no evidence of multicollinearity because no individual variable inflation factor (VIF) is greater than 10.		

Table 1 reports the full OLS regression estimates of our model when the dependant variable for public institutions is in-state tuition and fees. The following are the results of our analysis. Tuition and fees at the 206 religiously affiliated institutions is lower by \$2,577.78, *ceteris paribus*. Tuition and fees at the 359 private institutions is higher by \$19,727.95, *ceteris paribus*. Stated differently, the average federal, state, and local subsidy per student at public institutions in the 2008-09 academic year was \$19,727.95 per student. This per-student public subsidy has increased by \$2,497.98 when compared to a similar analysis made in Kench and Wallace (2010).

To measure regional differences in tuition and fees we used USNWR's regional categorization, which resulted in 179 northern, 104 southern, 107 western, and 128 mid-western

institutions. Relative to institutions in the north, tuition and fees at institutions in the south are lower by \$3,227.98, *ceteris paribus*. Relative to institutions in the north, tuition and fees at institutions in the west are lower by \$1,142.01, *ceteris paribus*. Relative to institutions in the north, tuition and fees at institutions located in the mid-west are lower by \$2,013.51, *ceteris paribus*. It is interesting to observe the deep discount for southern institutions – 2.8 times that of institutions in the west and 1.6 times that of institutions in the mid-west.

By focusing on the highest degree earned at an institution, we find significant differences in tuition and fees. First, relative to the 118 institutions that only award a bachelors degree, tuition and fess at the 133 institutions where the highest degree awarded is a PhD are lower by \$3,050.14, *ceteris paribus*. Whereas, tuition and fees are lower by \$3,920.69 at the 267 institutions where the highest degree awarded is a masters, *ceteris paribus*. There are at least two possible explanations for this difference. First, advanced degree programs typically charge higher tuition and fees, and thus some pressure to raise undergraduate tuition and fees is diminished. The second, and the more pessimist perspective, is that schools that offer advanced degree programs spread themselves too thin. A variety of resources are funneled into these advanced degree programs at the expense of the undergraduate degree program, and the effect of this diminution is measured by the market in the form of lower tuition and fees for institutions in this category. Administrators are often uncertain of the opportunity costs of their actions. In many cases administrators only count the benefits, e.g., tuition and fees from advanced degree programs. However, the coefficients on the variables *Masters* and *PhD* offer a market measure of the opportunity cost of having advanced degree programs.

The variables *percent of classes with less than 20 students* and *percent of classes with more than 50 students* capture the marginal effects of changing the number of seats offered in each class. The mean reported number of classes with less than 20 students equals 53.72%. The coefficient of the *percent of classes with less than 20 students* is insignificant. The mean reported number of classes with greater than 50 students equals 4.9%. The coefficient of the *percent of classes with greater than 50 students* reveals that if the percent of classes with greater than 50 students decreases by one percent, tuition and fees would increase by \$113.26, *ceteris paribus*. This result suggests that lowering the percent of classes with 50 or more students generates a bigger bang-for-the-buck than increasing the percent of classes with less than 20

students (because the coefficient *percent of classes with less than 20 students* is found not to be statistically significant). These results make the monetary benefits associated with altering class size clearer.

The students-to-faculty ratio is commonly advertised in an effort to attract prospective students. Of the 518 institutions in our dataset, the mean students-to-faculty ratio is 13.4. The marginal effect of decreasing this ratio by one percentage point is a \$287.97 per student, *ceteris paribus*.

The mean graduation rate at the 518 institutions in our dataset is 67.8, which informs us that 67.8 percent of all freshman graduate within 6 years. For each incremental increase in the graduation rate above the mean, institutions charge \$177.87 more in tuition and fees, *ceteris paribus*. Students are willing to pay more for higher than mean graduation rates and less for lower than mean graduation rates.

The mean student population in our dataset is 9,157. Our dataset contains 301 small institutions, with a student population below 5,999; 58 medium sized institutions, with a student population between 6000 and 8,999; and 159 large institutions, with a student population greater than 9,000. Relative to small institutions, medium sized institutions charge \$1,960.87 more per student, *ceteris paribus*. Large institutions, on the other hand, charge \$2,119.55 more per student relative to small institution, *ceteris paribus*.

In our dataset, 248 institutions are accredited by AACSB. Tuition and fees at institutions with the AACSB accreditation is \$1,036.66 higher relative to non-AACSB accredited institutions, *ceteris paribus*.

Rankings data from USNWR and PR have mixed results. First, consider the USNWR ranking data. After controlling for the other independent variables in our model, only the variable *USNWR top 10 masters west* is significant. Institutions ranked in the top 10 in the masters west region receive a premium of \$2,548.01 per student, *ceteris paribus*. Second, consider the PR rankings. Interestingly, the top 10 institutions where students are happiest with financial actually have tuition and fees that are lower by \$4,292.81, *ceteris paribus*. In addition, the top 10 most socially conservative institutions have tuition and fees that are lower by \$4,334.84 per student, *ceteris paribus*. However, students at the top 10 most homogeneous

institutions are willing to pay \$2,529.97 more per student for a homogeneous environment, ceteris paribus.

Table 2: Full Regression Estimates: Ordinary Least Squares of a Tuition & Fees (Out-of-State).

Parameter	Estimate	<i>p-value</i>
(Constant)	7671.64	.01
Secular	0	
Religious	-2194.25	<.00
Public	0	
Private	9536.04	<.00
North	0	
South	-1781.42	.00
West	122.12	.83
Mid-west	-1678.05	.00
Bachelors	0	
Masters	-3474.57	<.00
PhD	-2035.09	.02
Percent of classes with less than 20 students	24.89	.19
Percent of classes with more than 50 students	37.44	.53
Students to faculty ratio	-272.57	.00
Mean graduation rate	243.62	<.00
Student population between 1 and 5,999	0	
Student population between 6000 and 8999	1537.76	.03
Student population over 9000	-487.79	.74
No AACSB	0	
AACSB	636.82	.22
USNWR top 10 masters north	687.21	.64
USNWR top 10 masters south	2087.66	.12
USNWR top 10 masters west	2035.07	.13

USNWR top 10 masters mid-west	-1521.21	.26
USNWR top 10 national universities	-2072.87	.21
USNWR top 10 liberal arts	-487.79	.74
PR top 10 institutions with the best classroom experience	596.87	.70
PR top 10 institutions with the best Greek life	-1060.24	.46
PR top 10 institutions with the least happy students	913.77	.66
PR top 10 institutions with the happiest students	223.90	.88
PR top 10 institutions where students are happiest with financial aid	-4267.42	.01
PR top 10 institutions that are socially liberal	2702.04	.09
PR top 10 socially conservative institutions	-6520.56	<.00
PR top 10 institutions with the most diverse student population	-2592.38	.07
PR top 10 institutions with the most homogeneous student population	2494.02	.10
PR top 10 biggest party schools	776.95	.62
PR top 10 institutions where students rarely study	-145.91	.93
PR top 10 institutions where students always study	-318.92	.85
Adjusted R-square .791; F-statistic = 62.32, p-value = <.00; no evidence of multicollinearity because no individual variable inflation factor (VIF) is greater than 10.		

Table 2 reports the full OLS regression results when the dependant variable for public institutions contains out of state tuition and fees. In Table 2, the estimate of the control variable *west* is not significant. The choice variables *percent of classes with less than 20 students*, *percent of classes with greater than 50 students*, *student population over 9000*, and AACSB are not significant. Lastly, the rankings variables *USNWR masters west* and *PR top 10 institutions with the most homogeneous student population* are no longer significant.

The control variable *religious, private, south, mid-west*; the choice variables *masters, PhD, students to faculty ratio, mean graduation rate, student population between 6000 and 8999*; and the ranking variables *PR top 10 institutions where students are happiest with financial aid*, and *PR top 10 socially conservative institutions* all remain statistically significant – although the magnitude of each coefficient has changed. In addition, the rankings variable *PR top 10*

institutions that are socially liberal, which was not significant in table 1, is now marginally significant: students are willing to pay \$2,702.04 more in tuition and fees at the top 10 most liberal institutions, *ceteris paribus*.

What we have here are end points for the value of product characteristics in higher education. Because some public students do pay out of state tuition and fees, they certainly see the world through the lens of Table 2. However, many more students pay in state tuition and fees and thus see the higher education landscape through the lens of Table 1. It must also be noted that once the decision to attend a particular institution is made, some out of state students are able to capture in state prices by documenting relevant information. This effect places more weight on the result presented in Table 1; however, the results presented in Table 2 may, in no way, be dismissed.

Summary and Conclusions

It is hoped that administrators at colleges and universities around the U.S. will use the results of our analysis as a road map to help guide them in pricing their product optimally. In addition, the results offered here give important clues as to how the market would respond to decisions that enrollment managers might make. For example, the data reveal that students are willing to pay more to lower the percent of class with greater than 50 students. If budgets are tight, and we know that they are, then institutions should focus on decreasing the number classes with more than 50 students before they increase the number of classes with less than 20 students.

In addition, if your institution has a business school, it might be worth the enormous effort of gaining an AACSB accreditation. The data suggest that by adopting AACSB's standards for a quality management education, the institution as a whole seems to gain a positive externality. Administrators are often curious as to whether gaining an AACSB accreditation is worth the significant hurdles an institution must go over. Our empirical evidence identifies a benefit associated with having AACSB accreditation.

Institutions where a graduate program exists need to take note. Something interesting is happening in the market such that undergraduate students are paying less if a graduate program exists, relative to undergraduate students at institutions with no graduate programs.

Administrators should be concerned about entering this segment of the marketplace because the aggregate behavior of consumers has certainly signaling that something interesting is going on.

Finally, for all the conversation about campus Greek life, top party schools, and other PR categories, we observe, in most cases, no significant difference in the tuition and fees charged by the top ten institutions in these categories and all others. The exceptions are for institutions where students are happiest about financial aid and the most socially conservative institutions.

Bibliography

1. Benkard, C.L., and Bajari, P. 2004. "Demand Estimation with Heterogeneous Consumers and Unobserved Product Characteristics: A Hedonic Approach," NBER working paper 10278.
2. Berry. S., Levinsohn, J., and Pakes. A. 1995. "Automobile Prices in Market Equilibrium," *Econometrica*, Vol. 63, pp. 841-890.
3. Cabral, L. 2000. *Introduction to Industrial Organization*. Cambridge: The MIT Press.
4. D' Aveni, R. 2007. "Mapping Your Competitive Position," *Harvard Business Review*, November, pp. 110-120.
5. Gorman, T. 2980. "A Possible Procedure for Analyzing Quality Differentials in the Egg Market," *Review of Economic Studies*, 47(5): pp. 843-856.
6. Kench, B. T., and H. Scott Wallace. 2010. Mapping 2007-08 Tuition and Fees in Higher Education, *Journal of Applied Business Research*, 26(1): pp. 11-18.
7. Lancaster, K. 1966. "A New Approach to Consumer Theory," *Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 74, No. 2, April, pp. 132-157.
8. Lancaster, K. 1971. *Consumer Demand*. New York: Columbia University Press.
9. Petrin, A. 2002. "quantifying the Benefits of New Products: The Case of the Minivan," *Journal of Political economy*, 100: pp. 705-729.

Neglected Voices?—Dissent and Organizational Life

Authors:

Nasrin Shahinpoor, PhD
Associate Professor and Chair
Economics Department
Hanover College
Hanover, IN 47243
Tel: 812-866-7312
email: shahinpoor@hanover.edu

Bernard F. Matt, PhD
Director of Liberal Studies
Professor
Department of Religion and Philosophy
Wilmington College—Blue Ash Branch
9987 Carver Road
Blue Ash, Ohio 45242
Tel: 513-793-1337
Email: bmatt@wilmington.edu

Introduction

Two recent films powerfully portray characters whose actions seem hauntingly flawed. Hanna Schmitz in “The Reader” (2008) argues at her trial that her permitting hundreds of Jewish prisoners to die in a fire was permissible because it was her duty as a Nazi prison guard to prevent escapes. She claims this should be obvious to everyone that she had no alternative course of action. The other film is about soldiers stationed at the US Marine base at Guantanamo, Cuba. Two young Marines are on trial for killing Pfc. William T. Santiago, a member of their platoon. In “A Few Good Men” (1992) the soldiers received an order, a “Code Red,” that prompted their actions. Why did these characters not speak out, why did they not voice an objection to their respective orders? In Hanna Schmitz’s case, it is apparent at her trial, convened some twenty years after her career as a Nazi guard, that she has no grasp of the moral complexities of her actions. And upon her release from prison, after twenty years of incarceration, it is still not clear whether she understands that there might have been a moral failure in her silence. At least Lance Cpl. Harold W. Dawson comes to recognize the moral lapse of his failure to dissent from the

order he was given. Near the conclusion of the film, both defendants are read a verdict that exonerates them of the killing, but dishonorably discharges them from the Marines. Pfc. Downey cannot grasp why. In two of the most powerful lines in the film Dawson explains, “We were supposed to fight for the people who couldn’t fight for themselves. We were supposed to fight for Willie.”

It is temptingly easy to sit in judgment of these characters and righteously condemn them for either a lack of conscience or for their lack of courage to act upon their convictions or to speak their conscience. What makes these characters so compelling and so troubling is their humanity because as an audience we are drawn to identify with Hanna Schmitz and Harold Dawson. Their actions, or lack of actions, make them representative of us all; we are more like them than not. Of course, few of us make decisions or face situations that are matters of life and death as did they, but newspapers, broadcast news, the literature in business ethics and the office gossip are all rife with examples of men and women, from CEO’s to line workers, who did not speak out about and thus refused to dissent from actions, policies, and practices that were ethically egregious.

Our paper about dissent in organizations argues that, like Schmitz and Dawson, many employees fail to formulate and articulate their dissent, and lack the courage to act on their dissent, because they find themselves overwhelmed by social circumstances (the organizations they belong to) that make speaking out dangerous. Like Schmitz and Dawson, some employees find themselves in organizations that are repressive and authoritative. These are tragic circumstances, but ones that can be overcome.

In trying to analyze the ethical features of cases such as those in the films and in organizations, some ethicists focus on individual moral failure: Schmitz and Dawson should have known better, must have known better. As the trials at Nuremberg so powerfully illustrated, the rationale of “just following orders” lacks ethical justification. Schmitz and Dawson lacked the courage of their convictions. They are the “few bad apples” that make them exceptions from normal and average Germans or Marines. Other ethicists, and the authors are among this group, see the issues as more complex and more social in nature. Schmitz and Dawson are individuals enmeshed in cultures whose values are antithetical to, unsympathetic with, and hostile to individual conscience and action. They were trained to be loyal, not to question orders, not to

think for themselves. Thus to better understand Schmitz and Dawson as individuals and to properly understand their silence, we must also understand the social circumstances that shaped them and in which they found themselves. To fully understand individual action or inaction, one must also understand the circumstances and social situations that make speaking out such a perilous alternative. This is the case not only for understanding these films, but also for understanding how individuals act in an organizational environment.

We will argue that dissenting, speaking out, often takes great courage. We believe that recognizing and listening to dissent offers organizations a moment of hope and an opportunity to reform. The dissenter's courageous voice offers the organization the opportunity for transformation. We begin our analysis of dissent and courage by showing that most business organizations are voice denying; that is, some organizational values tend to be authoritative and reward conformity. In short, organizations require that the values of individuals be left outside the workplace. Organizations that operate in this way do so at considerable ethical peril; and the individuals who work within them suffer ethical harm. In the second section, we argue that one way to counteract this harm is through dissent. We describe dissent as coming into voice, or discovering one's voice; the dissenter is compelled by conscience to speak out. However, and this is the theme of the third section, organizational culture does not value dissent and often dissenters are punished. Thus, those who dissent face fear and risk. Overcoming fear and risk requires the courage to use or exercise voice. Fourth and finally, when organizations come to see the importance of the dissenter, when they grasp the dissenter as possessing a transformative voice, they are on the way to ethical improvement.

Denying Voice

In the late 1980's, anthropologist Robert Jackall (1988) gained access to several large corporations for the purpose of describing their organizational structure and behavior for his book, *Moral mazes: The world of corporate managers*. What he observed he named "bureaucratic ethics," and unfortunately he intended nothing flattering in the term. In his descriptions of these organizations he compared their structure and ethos to the feudal system: a vast hierarchy of king and lords and subjects. The lords (VP's and upper management) feared the king (the CEO) who expected them to be obedient and loyal; and the subjects (middle managers and workers) stood in fear of the lord who expected them to be obedient and loyal. The fortunes

of the middle managers rose and fell in accordance with the fate of their boss and the capriciousness of the market and economic forces. Most importantly, individual loyalty was the glue that held the system together, not allegiance principles or ideals. Loyalty and conformity to organizational leaders were rewarded by favors and benefits. Although incompetence was not tolerated, beyond demonstrating a certain level of competence it was one's social connections that mattered. This organizational culture made "its own internal rules and social context the principal moral gauges for action. Men and women in bureaucracies turned to each other for moral cues for behavior and came to fashion specific situational moralities for specific significant people in their worlds" (Jackall, 2002, p. 301).

It is a sad truth indeed that Jackall's observations are not particularly outdated. When we have assigned Jackall's article "Moral mazes: Bureaucracy and managerial work" to adult business students, many reported haunting similarities to their places of employment. Although few described their manager or boss as a lord and themselves as subjects, new terminologies were used instead: "the boy's club," the "good ol' boys network," "going along to get along," "keeping your head down," trying to be among those of the "in group," and struggling to "fit in" are some examples. These are just newer euphemisms that describe the same organizational structure and culture that Jackall calls the bureaucratic ethic. The common thread in these descriptions is that survival and success are defined by conformity with and loyalty to the values and behaviors of specific persons in power.

Conformity and loyalty are, of course, important values, but the way in which they operate when part of a bureaucratic ethic is ethically problematic. Why? Because under bureaucratic ethics what finally really matters is that employees be subservient to the needs of those in power and to the organization. What is actually required of employees is a certain mindlessness, which leads inevitably to a lack of individuality, a failure of authenticity, a collapse of integrity, a loss of self and the destruction of one's own moral compass. Conformity understood this way harms employees and extracts an unacceptable ethical price. The same holds true for loyalty. Under the bureaucratic ethic, loyalty (here understood as a kind of blind loyalty) is the value that trumps all other values. This means that dependency and reliance on someone else's judgment are actively cultivated by organizational leaders and the casualties for employees are the loss of their independence of thought and autonomy. The result here too is a loss of self

because one cannot be a self without the ability to freely exercise one's will and conscience. No one has expressed this more pointedly than Alford (2001) who declared that organizations are "the enemy of individual morality" (p. 35).

Another way of stating the core of bureaucratic ethics is that possessing the abilities to play the game and to navigate successfully the political aspects of organizational life are of paramount importance. Common workplace behaviors thus include acting contrary to one's own beliefs and character, looking the other way when one witnesses wrong doing, parroting the party line and mimicking "successful" behavior. Walton (2001) concludes, "[E]very adjustment I make to 'fit in' to such an organizational ethos goes against who I am and what I am morally able to do, and to corrode my integrity" (p. 119). Rather than remaining true to themselves, employees carefully subordinate themselves to the correct organizational expectations. Hector, an interviewee in Kidder's book *Moral Courage* states, "I think we all want to be part of the clan" (cited in Kidder, 2005, p. 118).

Even if one were to think the bureaucratic ethic characterizes organizational life too negatively or too harshly, milder characterizations of organization life still carry many ethical hazards. For example, organizations that restrict critique and creative thinking find themselves trapped by groupthink, where "unanimous agreement [is put] ahead of reasoned problem solving. Groups suffering from this symptom are both ineffective and unethical" (Johnson, 2009, p.238). Sticking with the group is more valued than sticking out, and remaining silent is more rewarded than speaking up against the values and decisions of the group. Those who do succeed in these organizations and become its managers and leaders surround themselves with like-minded people, yes-men/women, who are "isolated from criticism, or even serious discussion, of [their] thoughts and actions" (Schwartz, 1991, p. 256).

Admittedly, for many people managing workplace conflicts that result from a diversity of views or from divergent values is difficult and demanding; it is so easy and seductive to indulge in the comfort and safety of groupthink and conformity. After all, the workplace is supposed to be a harmonious, "nice" environment. Ciulla (1998) describes and critiques a tendency of Americans to be "nice" in the workplace. Niceness includes the belief that social harmony and a lack of conflict are positive ways of "accommodating and adjusting to people" (pp. 66-67). Niceness is the product of managerial reform movements of the 1980's and 1990's that promised

empowerment to employees, but actually delivered “bogus empowerment” (Ciulla, 1998, p.68). Being nice in Ciulla’s sense relies on merely making employees feel as though they had more independence, voice and autonomy, but in reality management maintains all the real power. Empowerment is an illusion created by managers to manipulate their employees by promising autonomy while actually diminishing it. The managers who maintain this kind of organizational culture are “unauthentic, insincere and disrespectful of others” (Ciulla, 1998, p. 68). At its best niceness invites a kind of insincere pleasantness. But more truthfully, it enforces a kind of mindlessness, a faking of civility, a disingenuous showing of care, concern or compassion. And at its worst niceness should really be viewed as alienation and dehumanization because it relies on dishonesty and inauthenticity on so many levels.

We conclude with one final set of observations about workplaces where voice is denied. In a college meeting some time ago, it was announced that three faculty positions were going to be eliminated. One member of the business department agreed with this decision explaining that “excess inventory” has to be eliminated. People, in his account, were no more than objects to be pitched overboard. Perhaps this comment is unusual and a bit excessive, but the dehumanizing language of employees as human capital or as labor inputs is hardly rare in business texts or in conversations within organizations.

Discovering Voice

Thankfully not everyone conforms or remains silent. Many people in the workplace speak out against structures and individuals who control them. We focus on one such voice as possessing a tremendous amount of significance and power: the voice of the conscientious dissenter. Why a “conscientious dissenter”? We use this term to underscore the importance of the dissenter speaking from her or his conscience, from ethical principles, from deeply held core values. When the dissenter speaks from conscience, she is revealing the self, she is speaking honestly and truthfully; the voice is authentic and possesses integrity. By conscientious dissent, we mean “principled dissent” as defined by Graham (1986): “*Principled organizational dissent* is the effort by individuals in the workplace to protest and/or to change the organizational status

quo because of their conscientious objection to current policy or practice” (emphasis in original; Graham, 1986, p. 2).

We will develop the importance of this kind of dissent in a moment. But first we want to clarify what dissent is not: it is not playing the Devil’s Advocate, nor is it the voice of the loyal opposition; it is not the complaint of the hysterical malcontent or the non-conformist. The Devil’s Advocate is one who announces that an objection or a criticism is not really one’s own, but rather an impersonal remark. Those of us who have played the Devil’s Advocate know that we are indulging in a kind of intellectual exercise where the views expressed serve to anticipate objections or to expose weaknesses in a position. Those who receive or hear comments know that the views expressed are not those of the speaker, thus the speaker is protected by wearing the mask of the Devil’s Advocate. Often, a member of a team will be assigned to play the role of a critical perspective. When one says, “I’m playing the Devil’s Advocate,” one is implying the arguments or positions are not mine. Thus the Devil’s Advocate is protected and accepted by the organization, and does not really reveal anything that is a matter of conscience or personal conviction.

A similar set of protections and social acceptances surround the members of the loyal opposition. Political parties and lawyers often practice a form of confrontational and even heated argument that assumes that through a vigorous adversarial process, truth will emerge. Labor unions and management often have this kind of a relationship as well. While the argument is unfolding it may seem that both sides are antagonists, but in the end both sides are committed to the good of the system or organization, both sides know that the successful continuation of the organization benefits them both. Neither side should take criticisms personally; doing so is something explicitly discouraged. Thus, like in the case of the Devil’s Advocate, loyal opponents in an argument do not learn anything personal about each other. They may observe elements of intellectual or imaginative abilities of their opponents, but nothing about their conscience or their personal values. Consider, for example, that representatives at the bargaining table and lawyers are duty bound to represent their party’s interests and to passionately and persuasively present their client’s interests even though they might find the positions objectionable.

And what about the chronic complainer, the one who always finds fault? The “hysterical malcontent” (Alford, 2001, p. 18) is one who always complains because he or she is habitually

unhappy and chronically discontent. The objections the chronic complainer voices are more general in nature—the complaints are about everything and everyone. The same holds true of the non-conformist; that is, of the one who perpetually refuses to come to agreement with organizational life. It does not matter what the issue is, the non-conformist will object out of habit or as part of an established pattern of behavior. Those around either the chronic complainer or the non-conformist can always anticipate an objection or a refusal. Although such individuals could become dissenters if a particular issue is one that is a matter of conscience, the chronic complainer need not be revealing conscience, principles or deep personal values and convictions, the characteristics of the dissenter.

Now that we have described what the dissenter is not like, what characterizes the dissenter? We begin by noting that dissenters bear many similarities to whistleblowers, many of whom first give voice to their dissent before they are forced to go either outside normal reporting structures or outside the organization, thus risking harm to the organization. The dissenter remains within the organization and attempts to resolve matters on the inside. Because the dissenter stays, we note an important feature of both dissenter and whistleblower: both are intensely loyal to the organization. Despite their nonconformity, Alford (2001) points out that whistleblowers desire to remain in the organization; and Hirschman finds that dissenters are loyal persons “who choose...to respond to perceived organizational decline by remaining and trying to improve things from within, i.e. to engage in principled organizational dissent” (Graham, 1986, p.4). Grant (2002) calls whistleblowers “secular saints” who, like dissenters, “represent one of the clearest instances in a secular culture of depths of devotion and dedication that are rare even in explicitly religious cultures” (p. 396).

We are now ready for a fuller description of what we mean by principled, conscientious dissent (or simply as dissent). From the observations above concerning some similarities between whistleblowers and dissenter, we note the first important characteristic of the principled conscientious dissenter is that loyalty is a very important principle. Rather than avoiding a problem by silence or quitting, the dissent is voiced within the organization with the aim to improve it. The loyal person’s “concern and labor are directed toward the good of the object of his loyalty, as if it were his own good. He does not limit himself to taking orders. Loyalty also

leads one to act with frankness and rectitude to improve as much as possible the institutions and communities he serves, and the actions of [one's] leaders" (Mele, 2001, p.19).

Dissenters are driven by their conscience to speak out, to be honest and truthful—whatever the consequences, silence is often more painful and dreadful. Alford's (2001) book about whistleblowers points this out repeatedly and it is certainly true for dissenters as well. Honesty is a kind of "choiceless choice" that one cannot resist; it is inconceivable that the truth not be told. One is "overwhelmed by [one's] own beliefs" (Alford, 2001, p. 40; p. 41). Only by speaking out can freedom be found (Alford, 2001); that is to say, only by actually dissenting. The act of dissent is directly tied to the dissenter's sense of self, and thus it is purely a matter of conscience.

By speaking contrary to the voices within the organization, the individuality of the dissenter is made public, vulnerable and bare. Because the dissenter speaks out, the organization is fully aware of this individual; the dissenter stands out, sticks out from the crowd. Not only is someone's name and face known, one's deepest convictions are laid bare since to speak from conscience is to disclose one's guiding principles, core values and deepest convictions. What was most intimate and private is now made public. The whole of the dissenter is thus exposed for public scrutiny in an organizational environment we have already described as unsympathetic to individuality and non-conformity.

Acting on Voice

We have shown that the dissenter is a person of integrity and is disposed to being loyal and honest. But actually voicing dissent is an act of courage above all. Courage is generally understood to involve one's acting well (or for the good) in the face of fear, anxiety and risk (Harris, 1999; 2001). We use the term to describe not an action but a virtue; that is, as "a permanent disposition of a person to act in a particular way when faced with various situations, almost, in a significant phrase of Aristotle, as if it were 'second nature' to act in such a way" (Mahoney, 1999, p.250). Thus courage is a character trait that a person possesses that "reflects the state or quality of mind or spirit that enables one to face danger, fear or vicissitudes with self-possession, confidence and resolution" (Sekerka & Bagozzi, 2007, p.135).

Courage to dissent stems from one's deepest convictions and values, from one's conscience. As Nien Cheng puts it, "One should basically know what is right and what is wrong—and, when you know that, be courageous enough to stand for what is right... That is the way to live—not to compromise with what is wrong" (cited in Kidder, 1994, p. 215). Doing what is right for the sake of its rightness and fulfilling one's obligation to perform one's duty consistent with one's conscience, characterize the courage to dissent as fundamentally deontological (acting on principle for the sake of the principle itself) rather than as consequentialist (acting according to beneficial outcomes).

An essential feature of courage is that it emerges in a situation that arouses fear, that requires a willingness to risk what is of value and that might even require self sacrifice. We argue that courage, especially the courage required to act on dissent, makes conceptual sense only in the context of an organizational life and culture as we have described it, one that conforms to the general characteristics of the bureaucratic ethic. If the organizational culture rewarded internal critique, and if bosses were supportive of contrary views, then neither dissent nor courage would be necessary—a view we develop fully in the final section. At this point, however, it is important to note that it takes courage, often considerable courage, to voice one's dissent in organizational environments that are hostile to criticism and to expressions of divergent points of view.

We begin with considering the greatest threats and fears a dissenter might face in this organizational environment. For if we take our cue from what happens to whistleblowers, the risks for dissenter are truly immense indeed! Alford (2001) documents how whistleblowers are not only fired but they are often cruelly retaliated against after they leave the organization and often blackballed within their professions, even if they are proven to be right. Organizational behavior at this point is purely irrational, indeed pathological, according to Alford (2001). Schwartz (2001) describes organizations as narcissistic and concerned exclusively with their own ideology and politics, and with their public image that must be and will be vigorously protected at all cost. It should not be surprising then that "bringing unpleasant issues to the forefront is often threatening and [one] may be viewed as a traitor" (Scarnati, 1999, p.326). So those who have threatened the internal workings of the organization or who are perceived to have tarnished its public image are in for an especially hard time. Whistleblowers often lose their families, their careers and their savings attempting to defend or to exonerate themselves. Jubb (1999) states,

“Confrontation, particularly by whistleblowing, of an organization that is judged to be in the wrong because it is off course or will not listen, is dangerous conduct which requires firm conviction, strength of purpose and considerable courage” (p.81).

Although we noted similarities between whistleblowers and dissenters, they are not the same. So let us next analyze the dangers faced by the dissenter that are less severe than the cruel and vindictive fate suffered by the whistleblower. Because organizational life is so often dominated by conformity, harmony and “going along to get along,” dissenters may face the threat of dismissal, or ostracism and isolation within the organization. They may suffer social sanctions from “withholding social privileges to outright social isolation and rejection as a deviant” (Cavanagh & Moberg, 1999, p.7). Rather than being recognized or appreciated for the contributions they bring to the organization, dissenters are pressured, bullied, punished and marginalized, often not only by their bosses, but by fellow employees. For example, Johnson (2009) notes that in organizations dominated by group think, dissenters are “coerced to go along with the prevailing opinion in the group” and that “certain members take it upon themselves to protect the leader and others from dissenting opinions that might disrupt the group’s consensus” (p.239). In this way, dissenters are pressured to remain silent and are made to feel that the expression of contrary ideas actually harms the organization or individuals. For the dissenter to speak out in such environments means facing these considerable risks and acting with fortitude nevertheless.

Because many employees are friends with workmates and even their bosses, the courage to espouse a dissenting position may involve risking friendships, social standing with a group or a team, or the loss of prestige and reputation. In organizational contexts that rely on “niceness” and the appearance of friendliness, to violate the comforts of conformity and harmony are sometimes taken as personal betrayals. The dissenter is thus often alienated from or avoided by colleagues and coworkers. Those who continue to associate with the dissenter often feel that they are at risk for being seen as sympathetic to or in agreement with the dissenter. Those collegial associations that do continue are often strained and uncomfortable; they lack the spontaneity they formerly had. And in organizations where developing one’s social network is important, straining relationships often equates to forfeiting opportunities for advancement. The dangers of being

perceived as not being a team player, or worse of being disloyal, are real and will have harmful consequences.

Thus far we have considered the high risk consequences of voicing dissent, but often even stating one's dissent, delivering unwelcome news itself takes considerable courage. Cavanagh and Moberg (1999) point out, "It often takes courage for a subordinate to deliver unfavorable news to a superior" (p.3). This difficulty is especially acute in organizations dominated by the bureaucratic ethic because the manager's protecting his or her image is crucial for survival in such organizations. To be contradicted, challenged, and perhaps even to be found incorrect make managers feel threatened and vulnerable. In authoritative organizations where managers are to be obeyed and not questioned, the dissenter's voice is often interpreted as a challenge to the manager's power and authority. Thus the response to the dissenter is often defensive: disagreement assumes the dissenter finds fault with individuals or with the organization, or that the manager or the organization are being attacked. Davis (2002) notes that whistleblowing, like dissent, is bad news: "[Managers] will have to participate in 'damage control' meetings, investigations, and the like ... They will ...worry about the effect of publicity on their own career..." (p.211). Jackall (2002) notes that to "blame someone is to injure him verbally in public; in large organizations, where one's image is crucial, this poses the most serious sort of threat" (p.295). The dissenter is thus often perceived and treated as the messenger who is blamed for delivering the bad news of an opposing point of view no matter how correct or necessary that opposing point of view turns out to be.

Thus the risks and dangers perceived by the dissenter are very real indeed and it takes courage to overcome these. Be they the larger fears of termination and retaliation to the smaller ones of hurting someone's feelings, the dissenter who speaks out does so with considerable courage. "Moral courage, it appears, is less consequentialist than deontological—determined not so much by the outcomes of the actions as by the duty or obligation we feel toward a particular core value, despite the possible consequences" (Kidder, 2005, pp.106-107).

Transforming Voice

Unfortunately, in many of today's organizational environments, it must be said that the need to write about the courage of dissent remains relevant because so many organizations are

essentially dysfunctional in the ways we have described. To many in a variety of organizations, it seems so easy and obvious to imagine and create alternative organizational cultures and structures. Imagine a workplace in which dissent was welcomed, where critical thinking and seeking alternatives answers were celebrated and cultivated, where managers thanked those who pointed out flaws in plans, where teams always wanted a fresh point of view. In such organizational cultures dissent would not even be recognized as dissent! An opposing point of view would merely be part of the normal way of doing business, it would be an integral part of everyday friendly conversations. And courage would not be required since the dissent would be rewarded and welcome—it would be expected.

How can an organization create the organizational culture we just briefly outlined? In this final section we argue that the courageous voice of dissent always holds out the possibility for organizational transformation. In that moment of recognizing the importance of the dissenter, a manager can restore dignity to employees and to the day to day interactions within the organization. “The experience of whistleblowers teaches that while resistance in the workplace challenges the practices, the ideology and the authority of those in power, it is also about the struggle for dignity and integrity in work organizations” (Rothchild & Miethe, 1994, p.267). That moment of recognition fulfills a dimension of courage outlined by Harris (2001) that suggests courage is the “overcoming of obstacles through hope” (p.3).

For the dissenter’s voice to be transformational, organizational leaders must recognize the courageous dissenter for who she truly is and for the skills that conscientious dissent embodies. Dissenters are often hard working, highly motivated, competent, respected, and committed professionals (Rothshchild & Miethe, 1994). Their willingness to bring new perspectives to bear on the organization demonstrates critical thinking and analytical skills. These are exactly the skills and dispositions that so many organizations actively seek and say they desire in their employees. At a minimum, dissenters should be appreciated and rewarded for these levels of competency.

But more important is the profoundly ethical orientation that the dissenting voice brings to the organization. Dissenters possess vital ethical capacities including integrity, loyalty and courage; they seek to promote and protect the good of the organization and the dignity of its members. As Keenan (2000) points out, whistleblowers (like, we add, dissenters) possess “higher levels of

moral reasoning” (p.202). Although dissenters may be naïve about the ways organizations often respond to dissent (since they are often surprised that they are so negatively treated), they are loyal above all. Were they not so loyal, were they not so interested in the good of the organization, they would have kept silent, or merely have left. They did not do either of these—they stayed and spoke out.

Responding appropriately to courageous dissent provides the organization and its leaders the opportunity to transform their organizations into ones that are more humane, open, and transparent. Ethical organizational leaders understand this because they “strive to create ethical environments even when faced with opposition from their superiors and subordinates” (Johnson, 2009, p.71). They seek to recognize and defuse defensive routines and to build a community in which assumptions can be suspended so that all members can truly think and learn together (Senge, 1999). Thus, to renew or to create anew an attitude of dignity within the organization is an ethical goal of the utmost importance. We think it is the most important ethical goal of management. An ethical organizational culture requires a daily and regular recognition of the dignity of all who work within an organization: the recognition of the integrity of individual conscience, a dedication to the development of individual talent, and a celebration of individual contributions. Mele (2003) describes the humanizing culture of an organization as addressing four elements: “1. Recognition of the person in his or her dignity, rights, uniqueness, sociability and capacity for personal growth; 2. Respect for persons and their human rights; 3. Care and service for persons around one; 4. Management towards the common good versus particular interests” (p.5).

A transformed organizational culture that values dissent and the courage of the dissent is one that is open to genuine and open dialogue. ”The availability of clear and open channels for the disclosure of organizational wrongdoings may enhance superior and sub-ordinate relations. The observer of a wrongdoing may be more likely to report the wrongdoing if there exist a trusting relationship between the complainant and compliant recipient” (King, 1999, p. 324). Those who work in humane organizations will be free to speak out on matters of conscience and organizational leaders will greatly benefit, in a practical sense, because they will be able to avoid mistakes and anticipate problems. The members of the organization will no longer need courage

to speak out, and dissent will not be recognized beyond the normal critical day to day conversations.

We are hopeful that dissenters will be able to speak their conscience and that organizations will be able to transform themselves, to improve themselves, by recognizing the dignity and importance of the dissenter. One way this can be accomplished is by establishing an organizationally recognized forum by which both sides can enter into dialog. In engaging in this dialog, both management and the dissenter must understand that their view is not guaranteed to prevail, although it might. Compromise may be necessary, reasonable and consistent with both conscientious objections and organizational values. And both sides must consider the possibility that open dialog may mean they come to see their original positions as wrong. Both sides must be open to listening, engaging in genuine dialog, remaining honest and transparent, and to providing reasons and evidence for their position. There should be a firm commitment to the process of searching for a good ethical solution. And both sides need humility. There is no guarantee that even this amount of good will always results in a mutually satisfactory outcome. Organizations will be well served in developing a process that is fair and that possesses integrity, one that protects the integrity of both parties. This will go a long way in humanizing organizations and creating a culture of mutual dignity, However, because management is in the position of power, this process cannot begin until the dissenter is recognized as a vital and valued member of the organization.

References

- Alford, C.F. (2001). *Whistleblowers: Broken lives and organizational power*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Brown, D. (Producer), Sarokin, A. (Screenwriter), & Reiner, R. (Director). (1992). *A few good men* [Motion Picture]. United States: Columbia Pictures.
- Cavanagh, G.F. & Moberg, D.J. (1999). The virtue of courage within the organization, in M.L. Pava (Ed.), *Research in ethical issues in organizations* (Vol. 1) (pp. 1-25). Stamford, CT: JAI Press.

- Ciulla, J.B. (1998). Leadership and the problem of bogus empowerment', in J.B. Ciulla (Ed.), *Ethics, the heart of leadership* (pp.63-86). Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Davis, M. (2002). Avoiding the tragedy of whistleblowing. In R.A. Larmer (Ed.), *Ethics in the workplace: Selected readings in business ethics* (2nd ed.) (pp. 208-216). Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Thomson Learning.
- Graham, J.W. (1986). Principled organizational dissent: A theoretical essay. *Research in Organizational Behavior*, 8, 1-52.
- Grant, C. (2002). Whistle blowers: Saints of secular culture. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 39, 391-399.
- Harris, H. (2001). Courage: Management virtue or dangerous excess? [Online]. Available: <http://www.unisa.edu.au/hawkeinstitute/gig/documents/courage-dangerous.pdf> [July 17, 2009].
- Harris, H. (1999). Courage as a management virtue. *Business and Professional Ethics Journal*, 19(3 & 4), 27-46.
- Jackall, R. (1988). *Moral mazes: The world of corporate managers*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Jackall, R. (2002). Moral mazes: Bureaucracy and managerial work. In T. Donaldson, P. Werhane, & M. Cording (Eds.), *Ethical issues in business: A philosophical approach* (pp. 284-301). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Johnson, C.E. (2009). *Meeting the ethical challenges of leadership: Casting light or shadow*. Los Angeles, CA: Sage.
- Jubb, P.B. (1999). Whistleblowing: A restrictive definition and interpretation. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 21(1), 77-94.
- Keenan, J.P. (2000). Blowing the whistle on less serious forms of fraud: A study of executives and managers. *Employee Rights and Responsibilities Journal*, 12(4), 199-217.
- Kidder, R.M. (2005). *Moral Courage*. New York: Harper Collins.

- Kidder, R.M. (1994). *Shared values for a troubled world: Conversations with men and women of conscience*. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass Publishers.
- King, G., III.. (1999). The implications of an organization's structure on whistleblowing. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 20, 315-326.
- Mahoney, J. (1999). Cultivating moral courage in business. In G. Enderle (Ed.), *International business ethics: Challenges and approaches* (pp. 249-259). Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
- Mele, D. (2001). Loyalty in business: Subversive doctrine or real need? *Business Ethics Quarterly*, 11(1), 11-26.
- Mele, D. (2003). Organizational humanizing cultures: Do they generate social capital?, *Journal of Business Ethics*, 45, 3-14.
- Minghella, A., Pollack, S., Gigliotti, D., & Morris, R. (Producers), Hare, D. (Screenwriter), & Daldry, S. (Director). (2008). *The reader* [Motion Picture]. United States: Mirage Enterprises.
- Rothschild, J., & Miethe, T.D. (1994). Whistleblowing as resistance in modern work organizations: The politics of revealing organizational deception and abuse. In J.M. Jermier, D. Knights, & W.R. Nord (Eds.), *Resistance and power in organizations* (pp. 252-273). London: Routledge.
- Schwartz, H.S. (1991). Narcissism project and corporate decay: The case of General Motors, *Business Ethics Quarterly*, 1(3), 249-268.
- Scarnati, J.T. (1999). Beyond technical competence: The art of leadership. *Career Development International*, 4/6, 325-335.
- Sekerka, L.E. & R.P. Bagozzi. (2007). Moral courage in the workplace: Moving to and from the desire and decision to act. *Business Ethics: A European Review*, 16(2), 132-149.

Senge, P.M. (1999). The leader's new work: Building learning organizations, in T. Donaldson & P.H. Werhane (Eds.), *Ethical issues in business: A philosophical approach* (pp. 497-518). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.

Walton, C. (2001). Character and integrity in organizations: The civilization of the workplace. *Business and Professional Ethics Journal*, 20(3 & 4), 105-128.